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Small unmanned aerial systems (UAS), more commonly known as ‘drones,’
are an increasing security risk to fixed facilities due to their ease of use, high
performance, and increasing prevalence. Prison systems have experienced incidents
where drones were used to introduce contraband, such as cell phones, drugs, and
weapons (Harvey, 2018; Otte, 2017). In December 2018, drones disrupted flights
for an estimated 110,000 people over several days at London’s Gatwick Airport
(“Drones Ground Flights at Gatwick,” 2018). Systems to counter UAS are rapidly
being developed but are often unattainable by a majority of organizations due to
high cost, liability concerns, and regulatory restrictions.
The FAA Reauthorization Act of 2018 defines counter unmanned aerial
system (C-UAS) technology as “a system or device capable of lawfully and safely
disabling, disrupting or seizing control of an unmanned aircraft or unmanned
aircraft system” (p. 100). For this paper, C-UAS will include active measures to
detect and interdict unwanted UAS traffic by a facility or entity. While geofencing
has proven beneficial in deterring casual drone users from overflying restricted or
otherwise sensitive areas, it is largely dependent on the drone manufacturer to
implement and may be easily disabled by the user. Since the protected facilities
have no active control over geofencing it will not be considered a C-UAS.
Industry regulatory standards for C-UAS are in the process of being
developed but are not yet implemented. Several governing bodies have been
identified to develop technical standards within this field. A multitude of legal
issues exist that prevent public and private organizations from conducting C-UAS
operations due, largely, to a broad application of the term “aircraft” and subsequent
measures to protect manned aviation. Currently, few Federal agencies are legally
permitted to use C-UAS technology within the United States within the constraints
outlined in Public Law. This paper serves as a collective summary of the current
state of C-UAS policy within the U.S. and highlights the current lack of industry
standards and identifies major efforts to develop these standards.
Industry Regulatory Standards of C-UAS
As of December of 2019, the Counter-Drone Systems report highlighted
that there are 537 C-UAS products and systems offered by over 277 different
companies (Michel, 2019). It was noted that not a single manufacturer consulted in
preparing the report was able or willing to provide operational or test data
associated with their systems. This resultant C-UAS environment is one where
manufacturers may publish performance specifications that are not established
under a testing standard. From a consumer standpoint, this is concerning because
manufacturer marketing claims may not match the operational performance of a
system. In addition to this, many of the technical standards for drone technology
are currently under development, making C-UAS more difficult to implement
against the wide variety of methods being used by drone manufacturers (McCabe,
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2020). Standardization of these technical aspects is one step toward the reliable
performance that will help C-UAS become available outside of the Federal
government.
Before a manufacturer sells a product within a market, the manufacturer
must first determine if the product category is subject to any regulations or related
industry standards. Regulations may require that a product adheres to certain
technical specifications or testing standards (Standards Portal, 2020). Generally,
these regulations are designed to protect the consumer. For example, a consumer
purchasing gasoline that is not produced in accordance with approved
specifications or standards could encounter costly vehicle repairs. Failing to adhere
to the applicable laws and standards may result in manufacturers being subject to
market denial, fines, imprisonment, or other penalties (Standards Portal, 2020).
Governments rely on regulations and technical standards specifications generally
established by professional bodies or standards organizations to ensure products
follow industry best practices. Currently, no standards or regulations exist for CUAS technology.
Standards Organizations
Several major standard-setting organizations within the U.S. oversee the
development of standards within their respective areas of expertise. Examples of
this include NSF International, which develops standards related to public health
and safety, and the Society of Automotive Engineers International, who develop
technical standards for self-propelled vehicles (Standards Developing
Organizations, 2020). The American National Standards Institute (ANSI) is a nonprofit standards organization that is made up of government, industry, and
professional, technical, and trade societies. ANSI manages the establishment and
implementation of thousands of standards across virtually all sectors of the
economy (Grainger, 2020). ASTM International (formerly the American Society
for Testing and Materials) serves similarly to ANSI and develops voluntary
consensus standards for products, materials, systems, and services (Grainger,
2020).
Lack of C-UAS Technical Standards
In September 2017, ANSI stood up the Unmanned Aircraft Systems
Standardization Collaborative (UASSC) in collaboration with the Federal Aviation
Administration (FAA), the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), ASTM, and
others, to help research and guide public policy and guidelines concerning the
rapidly expanding UAS ecosystem (ANSI UASSC, 2020). The UASSC established
a standardization roadmap to identify experts and stakeholders within facets of the
UAS ecosystem and to guide efforts for standardization. The document
acknowledges that “A comprehensive evaluation template for testing C-UAS
systems is needed,” and that “standards must be developed for user identification,
design, performance, safety, and operations”(McCabe, 2020, p. 377). McCabe
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further reports that there is a general lack of standards within the C-UAS industry,
noting a significant variance of effectiveness and reliability of these systems.
“Detection and mitigation of unmanned aerial threats” was listed as a high priority,
and noted that standards in-development are not generally known to the public, due
to the sensitive nature of C-UAS implementation for entities entitled to mitigate
UAS threats (McCabe, 2020). The USAAC has a comprehensive list of UAS
related standards that are currently in development to meet the rapidly growing
presence of UAS within the U.S.
Legal Issues Preventing C-UAS Implementation
Federal law prevents organizations from using C-UAS other than a few
select federal agencies, such as the Department of Defense (DoD), the Department
of Energy (DOE), the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), and the
Department of Justice (DOJ). These specific use cases will be discussed in a later
section. To better understand these legal concerns, it is important for one to know
some of the current detection and interdiction methods. Generally, C-UAS systems
work by identifying and potentially tracking an intrusive UAS with sensors
designed to detect some characteristic of the UAS. Methods for detecting and
tracking include radar, acoustic, electro-optical, radio-frequency, and infrared.
Often two or more of these detection methods are used. For example, a coarse
bearing and location can be used from a network of acoustic sensors to cue a finedetect electro-optical sensor on to the target for classification and processing
(Siewert et al., 2019).
Interdiction methods involve means to subdue, divert, or destroy an
intrusive UAS and can be accomplished through a myriad of means. Table 1
represents a summary of some of the more popular methods employed to interdict
a UAS. To successfully mitigate an unwanted UAS threat, a drone must first be
detected by sensors, then interdicted by one of the methods discussed in Table 1.
Many laws are currently in place that would prevent individuals and organizations
from using these methods and carry heavy fines and potential prison time (Michel,
2019).
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Table 1
Types of Interdiction Methods Currently Employed
Sensor Type
Description
Interrupts the RF link between UAV and operator by
Radio Frequency
generating large amounts of RF output. Once the RF link is
(RF) Jamming
disturbed, the UAV will land or return to the operator
Interrupts the satellite link used for navigating. Once the
GNSS Jamming
satellite link is lost, UAV will hover or land
Taking control of the UAV by hijacking the communications
Spoof
link
Destroys portions of the airframe with directed energy,
Kinetic
causing a crash
Net
Entangles the UAV or its rotors
Projectile
Employs ammunition to destroy UAV
Several C-UAS methods employed – commonly tandem RF
Combination
and GNSS jamming
Note. Descriptions are adapted from Michel (2018, p. 4)
The following represents several of the categories that carry legal
implications for the use of C-UAS technology.
Federal Communications Commission (FCC)
The FCC is an independent Federal regulatory agency that regulates
domestic and international communications within the U.S. and is the primary
authority for communication law and regulation. The FCC is responsible for Title
47 of the Combined Federal Regulations (CFR) and is granted authority through
Title 47 of the United States Code (U.S.C.) (FCC, 2010). Title 47 (U.S.C.) Section
(§) 301 requires licenses for entities to operate radio transmitters and compliance
with FCC regulations. This would require entities to acquire authorization and
licenses for the use of any radar UAS detectors, and RF and GPS jamming
equipment. Title 47 U.S.C. § 302(a) prohibits the sale and use of devices that
interfere with radio reception. Similarly, Title 47 U.S.C. § 333 prohibits
maliciously or willfully interfering with any radio communications with a licensed
station. This would directly preclude the sale and use of applicable RF and GPS
jamming and spoofing operations. In 2016, a Chinese company was ordered to pay
over $34 million to the FCC for the sale of signal jammers on their website
(Rupprecht Law, 2020). The FCC related laws preclude several of the more popular
interdiction methods commonly used by the federal government to include spoofing
and jamming.
Criminal Code
Small unmanned aircraft are required to register with the Federal Aviation
Administration (FAA) per Title 14 C.F.R. § 48.15 in which the definition of
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“aircraft” is adopted from Title 49 U.S.C. § 40102 as “any contrivance invented,
used, or designed to navigate, or fly in, the air.” The application of this regulation
to UAS inherently implies that small UAS are subject to many of the same laws
that apply to larger manned aircraft. Therefore, any individual or organization that
interdicts a small UAS may be subject to the same penalties imposed for larger
manned aircraft.
Title 18 U.S.C. § 32 prohibits willful disablement, destruction, and damage
to any aircraft within the jurisdiction of the United States, and carries a hefty fine
and up to a 20-year prison sentence. This statute bans the use of kinetic, net,
projectile, and other potentially destructive means of interdicting a small UAS. .
Additionally, many Title 47 statutes that prevent C-UAS include a reference to Title
18 statutes, which carry fines or prison sentences as well. Title 18 U.S.C. § 1367
prohibits the interference with satellite transmissions and carries the penalty of a
fine and a prison sentence of up to ten years.
Federal Aviation Administration (FAA)
The FAA established Title 14 C.F.R. § 107 to integrate UAS into the
National Airspace System (NAS). Part 107 covers registration, certification, and
operational regulations and procedures required to operate a civil small UAS within
the U.S. From a legal perspective, an entity that successfully spoofs the UAS link
and takes control of the aircraft is required to comply with Title 14 C.F.R. § 107.
This requires a successful spoofer to have appropriate FAA certifications, airspace
waivers (if applicable), and established a pilot in command for the flight.
Additionally, the spoofer is responsible for the condition of the aircraft and the
safety of the remaining flight (Rupprecht Law, 2020). In essence, the spoofer
becomes completely liable for the aircraft and anything that happens for the
remainder of the flight. Spoofing has possible additional penalties under Title 49
U.S.C. § 46308, in which a penalty of fines and up to 5 years imprisonment for a
person with an intent to interfere with air navigation by interfering with a “true light
or signal.”
A 2019 FAA letter to airports reiterates some of the criminal penalties that
could be leveraged from C-UAS implication and continues to cite some of the
additional concerns with airport-specific implementation (FAA C-UAS letter to
airports, 2019). This letter discusses the use of UAS sensors as a potential point of
contention due to the emissive properties of many of the sensors. For example,
while audio sensors are typically considered passive, they are typically required to
be networked to other sensors and processing stations to locate and identify threats
properly. This is typically through wireless networking between components of the
system. The FAA letter cites Title 14 C.F.R. § 77 which requires airports to notify
the FAA for any planned airport alterations and sets standards for determining if
they cause obstructions to air navigation (FAA C-UAS Letter to Airports, 2019).
Additionally, the FAA cautions the use of UAS detection systems due to potential
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unknown effects on the navigational facilities and transmitters (NAVAIDs) used
by pilots to navigate the national airspace. The letter also cites Title 14 C.F.R. §
139.333, requiring the protection of NAVAIDs as part of the airport certification
process. While the FAA acknowledges the potential threat that UAS present, it
certainly does not condone the casual use of even passive C-UAS technology for
airports.
Legal C-UAS Implementation
Several federal entities are allowed to legally conduct C-UAS per public
law. The National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) FY 2017 allows C-UAS
implementation to the Department of Energy (DOE) and the Department of Defense
(DoD). Division H of The FAA Reauthorization Act of 2018, also cited as the
Preventing Emerging Threats Act of 2018, subsequently grants similar C-UAS
implementation to the Department of Justice (DOJ) and the Department of
Homeland Security (DHS).
Authorized C-UAS Actions
Both the NDAA 2017 and FAA Reauthorization Act of 2018 use similar
verbiage to authorize C-UAS actions to the DoD, DOE, DOJ, and DHS. However,
the context and justifications in which C-UAS actions may be employed differ
between departments. In general, the DoD and DOE have slightly more freedom to
execute actions to “mitigate the threat… to the safety or security of a covered
facility or asset” (NDAA, 2017, pp. 641, 758) when compared with the DHS and
DOJ actions being limited executing actions to “mitigate a credible threat…to the
safety or security of a covered facility or asset” (FAA Reauthorization Act of 2018,
p. 339). All four agencies’ respective Secretaries are required to consult with the
Secretary of Transportation for implementation of these C-UAS actions. This is
primarily to mitigate and monitor negative impacts to the National Airspace
System. The FAA Reauthorization Act of 2018 and the NDAA 2017 list the
following broad actions permitted for UAS threat mitigation by the DoD, DOE,
DHS, and DOJ:
• Detect, identify, monitor and track UAS
• Warn the UAS operator
• Disrupt control of the UAS
• Seize or exercise control of the UAS
• Use reasonable force to disable, damage, or destroy the UAS
Permitted DoD and DOE C-UAS Justifications
The primary difference between each of the respective agencies' ability to
conduct C-UAS lies in how a ‘covered facility or asset’ is defined for each agency.
Each of the respective agencies’ secretary can define a covered asset or facility
within the scope of the agency’s responsibilities and under broad guidelines
outlined in legislation. The NDAA 2017 (p. 759) defines a covered facility or asset
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for the DOE as one which is owned by the United States and is used to store or use
special nuclear material. Essentially, nuclear facilities are covered and the DOE can
take the listed actions above to protect these facilities.
The DoD’s ‘covered facility or asset’ is one that the Secretary of Defense
identifies, is within the United States (or territories), and relates to the DoD’s
nuclear deterrence mission, missile defense mission, or national security space
mission NDAA 2017 (p. 642). It is important to note that these restrictions apply
only within the United States, and there are tactical guidelines to dispatch unwanted
UAVs in combat situations. These provisions allow the DoD to continue strategic
missions and deal with potential UAS threats appropriately.
Permitted DOJ and DHS C-UAS Justifications and Additional Restrictions
The DOJ and DHS have more restrictions and additional requirements
placed upon them for C-UAS activities as outlined in the FAA Reauthorization Act
of 2018 when compared to the DOE and DoD, likely due to the immediate gravity
of possible consequences from unmitigated UAS threats from the ‘covered facilities
or assets’ overseen by the DOE and DoD. Both the DOJ and DHS are authorized
to take the common C-UAS actions for National Special Security Events and
Special Event Assessment Rating events, at the request of the Governor for a
specific time and specific event, and to protect active Federal law enforcement
investigations, emergency response, or security functions that are also limited for a
specific time and event (FAA Reauthorization Act of 2018, p. 344).
The DOJ is also permitted to take C-UAS action to protect the President of
the United States and Attorney General, as well as federal detention centers,
correctional facilities, and buildings, to include courts, that are owned or operated
by the DOJ. The U.S. Marshals Service is somewhat unique in that it is specifically
listed to protect certain persons instead of ‘facilities or assets’ and can take C-UAS
action to protect “Federal jurists, court officers, witnesses and other threatened
persons in the interest of justice” (FAA Reauthorization Act of 2018, p. 344). The
U.S. Attorney General recently published department guidance on the
implementation of this Act, describing the processes in which covered facilities will
be identified, required risk-based assessments, and other measures designed to
preserve First and Fourth Amendment rights (Barr, 2020).
The DHS has several other justifications for taking C-UAS action that are
separate from the shared justifications with the DOJ. The DHS is authorized to use
C-UAS actions for security and protection functions related to U.S. Customs and
Border Protection, Secret Service protection operations, and to protect buildings
and facilities occupied or secured by the Federal Government (FAA
Reauthorization Act of 2018, p. 344).
The United States Coast Guard (USCG) falls under the purview of the DHS
but has unique justifications for authorized use of C-UAS actions and is separately
mentioned in the FAA Reauthorization Act of 2018. The ‘covered facility’ for the
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USCG is one that is under the administrative control of the Commandant USCG or
a vessel or aircraft that is involved in a USCG mission. The USCG may execute CUAS actions involving a mission escorting or assisting a DoD vessel, other high
value or high personnel vessels, to protect the POTUS and VPOTUS, as well as in
search and rescue operations (FAA Reauthorization Act of 2018, p. 347).
A summary of the C-UAS implementation for Federal entities can be found in Table
2.

https://commons.erau.edu/ijaaa/vol7/iss3/11
DOI: https://doi.org/10.15394/ijaaa.2020.1515

8

Cline et al.: The State of C-UAS in the U.S.

Table 2
Federal C-UAS Authorized
Activity
Department

Grounds

Location

DoD

DOE

Facility or
asset
identified by
the
Secretary of
Defense

Facility or
asset
identified by
the
Secretary of
Energy

DOJ

DHS

Facility, asset, or persons
identified by the Attorney
General (DOJ) or Secretary of
Homeland Security (DHS) as
high-risk and a potential target
of unlawful unmanned aircraft
activity

Located within the United States or one of its territories

1) National Security Special
Event
2) Special Event Assessment
Rating
3) At the request of a Governor
4) Protect active Federal
1) Nuclear
investigation
deterrence
mission
5) FBI:
5) U.S.
2) Missile
1) Storage
protection of
Customs
defense
or use of
POTUS and AG and Border
Justifications
mission
nuclear
6) Marshals:
Protection
3) National
material
protection of
6) Secret
security
personnel
Service
space
involved in
protection
mission
Federal trial
operations
7) Protection of
7)
correctional
Protection
facilities, courts, of Federal
and other DOJ
buildings
buildings
USCG
Note. United States Coast Guard (USCG) falls under DHS but has separate
grounds and authorized C-UAS justifications

USCG*
Facility under control
of the Commandant or
a vessel or aircraft
operated by, assisted
by, or otherwise
involved in a mission
with the USCG
Not explicitly bound
by location

1) Assistance or escort
mission for DoD
2) Assistance or escort
mission for a vessel of
national security
significance, or a high
interest, capacity, or
value vessel
3) Protection of the
POTUS and VPOTUS
4) National Security
Special Event
5) Special Event
Assessment Rating
6) Air Defense of US
7) Search and rescue
mission

In addition to the necessary coordination with the Department of
Transportation and the FAA for all C-UAS activities, both the DOJ and DHS have
additional requirements and restrictions placed upon them. Both departments are
required to “establish research, testing, training on, and evaluation of” equipment
used for C-UAS before its implementation in the field (FAA Reauthorization Act
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of 2018, p. 340). Other restrictions on the two departments include civil privacy
protections to preserve First and Fourth Amendment rights. Both the DOJ and DHS
are only allowed to keep electronic communications and data regarding C-UAS
actions for up to 180 days and are prohibited from sharing such information outside
of their respective departments unless the Secretary of Homeland Security or
Attorney General determines that the information is necessary for prosecution or
purposes of ongoing litigation (some exclusions apply to both of these rules).
Additionally, semi-annual briefings are required to appropriate Congressional
subcommittees regarding any previously mentioned exclusions and activities
related to C-UAS policy and efforts (FAA Reauthorization Act of 2018, p. 341342).
Conclusion
C-UAS implementation and policy are still in the early stages within the
United States. As the UAS threat becomes more prevalent, reliable and accessible
C-UAS options will need to be available to public agencies and private industry
most at risk for drone threats. For this industry to mature, performance standards
and testing metrics will need to be developed and adopted that pose minimal
adverse effects to the National Airspace System. Once standards are set, new legal
definitions can be applied to the equipment in use for manufacturer compliance,
and implementation by non-federal entities. The required DHS and DOJ research
and testing, coupled with the required semi-annual briefings to the appropriate
Congressional committees, may serve as a responsible way to gather insights and
data for wider C-UAS adoption. New legal definitions may be needed for UAS to
prevent the hefty penalties that may be imposed for their interdiction.
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§
C-UAS
CFR
DHS
DoD
DOE
DOJ
FAA
NAVAID
POTUS
UAS
UAV
SECDEF
VPOTUS
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Definitions
Section (generally used in reference to regulations and statutes)
Counter Unmanned Aerial System(s)
Code of Federal Regulations
Department of Homeland Security
Department of Defense
Department of Energy
Department of Justice
Federal Aviation Administration
Aerospace Navigational Aid
President of the United States
Unmanned Aerial System
Unmanned Aerial Vehicle
Secretary of Defense
Vice President of the United States
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